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Abstract:  Whether common-pool resources are used and managed in a 
sustainable manner depends highly on incentives.  Incentives influence 
the behaviour of individuals with respect to natural resource 
management and are determined by institutional arrangements 
including formal and informal rules and markets. Changes in 
institutional arrangements will affect individual incentives and will 
therefore have an impact on resource use. 
To model the connections between institutional arrangements and the 
sustainable use of common-pool resources requires the consideration 
of individual behaviour. Some game-theoretical models appear to be an 
adequate modelling technique with which to assess the behaviour of 
individuals as well as the development of institutions in common-pool 
resource regimes. The implementation of a game-theoretical 
framework in the form of an agent-based model seems to be a 
particularly appropriate tool with which to assess common-pool 
resource use regimes as such models enable the behaviour of different 
agents to be modelled as strategies (eg: self-interest, collective-
interest).  
Traditionally with agent-based models, the strategies that agents 
pursue are given, determined by the set of rules, which govern their 
behaviour. In this paper we focus on the implementation of 
mechanisms that also allow for rules to adapt endogenously. Such an 
approach will be applied to common-pool resources use in order to 
analyse the effect of rule changes. 
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1.  Introduction 
Common-pool resources are often confronted with the threat of being overused 
because they are defined by a low excludability of users and high subtractability of 
use. In situations where multiple users have access to the resource, individual 
behaviour determines if a resource is used in a viable way. Incentives for individual 
behaviour are defined by so-called institutional arrangements, including markets as 
sources for incentives, as well as boundaries for individual decisions. These 
behavioural regularities (Ostrom, Gardner and Walker 1994, 19) evolve from and 
depend on several drivers such as environmental conditions.  
In the context of multiple-use, different interests come together and impact the 
common-pool resource considerably. These interests are based on different ways of 
resource use, which can have a preserving or an exploiting influence on the common-
pool resource.  
The elements of an institutional arrangement are linked by a complex system. 
Perturbations like environmental shocks or exogenous changes in statutory law affect 
these arrangements and the system must adapt to the new conditions. The aim of this 
paper is to describe how a predictive tool can be developed in order to evaluate the 
impact of such changes in institutional arrangements. This tool aims to simulate the 
use of common-pool resources in the context of multiple-use.  
In section  2 the research project, in which this work is embedded, is explained. 
Section 3 discussed common-pool resources in the context of multiples-use. Section 4 
gives an overview of the theoretical work on institutional arrangements, followed by 
section 5, where the individual dimension of agents and their adaptation process is 
discussed. Section 6 analyses the impact of links between individual, while section 7 
brings the individual agents and their links together in a systems perspective and 
analyses the adapting dynamics of the structure. In section 8 agent-based models are 
specified for four games and the results of the scenarios are discussed. Section  9 
draws conclusions from this work. 
2.  Case-study context  
The project Opportunities for the Australia Outback – Researching institutional 
arrangements in the North (Greiner 2003 and Smajgl, Vella and Greiner 2003) 
analyses the existing institutional arrangements in the Outback of Australia using 
different case studies and develops a predictive capacity to evaluate the effect of 
possible changes. The analysis is conceptualised as a holistic approach in order to 
evaluate environmental and socio-economic impacts. Environmental impacts focus on 
multiple-use and multiple-user issues and include common-pool resources. Therefore, 
the concept of this project has a qualitative dimension in which a framework has to be 
developed with which to analyse institutional arrangements and structure the 
information gained from different case studies.  
The problem of common-pool resources can only be analysed in a contextual way; 
every situation has different rules and incentives to govern the use of the resource. In 
an applied approach it means, for instance, that the users and the rules these users 
follow have to be identified, the common-pool resource and its biophysical dynamics   3
have to be understood, and the incentives driven by institutions like markets, 
categorised. For such a qualitative analysis, different approaches were developed, 
such as the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework 
(Ostrom 1990, Ostrom 2003) and the Multiple Use Commons Framework (Edwards 
and Steins 1998).  
The case studies will be located in small areas in pairs and they will have different 
institutional arrangements but similar environmental conditions (like rainfall) and vice 
versa. The quantitative dimension develops a predictive tool with which to process 
the data delivered by the case studies and structured by the qualitative framework. 
This predictive tool has to mimic these outback areas as systems considering 
environmental and socio-economic elements. In this paper we will develop a 
preliminary step for the development of this predictive capacity. For this purpose I 
will give an overview on research in institutional economics and develop from that 
point on a quantitative modelling approach.  
3.  Multiple users and multiple use 
As described in section 2 our analysis is focused on land use in the outback of 
Australia. Land can be used in a variety of different ways, from planting crops, over 
grazing cattle, to pure transportation purposes. If a resource, in this case land, is used 
for different purposes (at the same time) we have a multiple use context. A multiple 
user context is defined if more than one person uses the resource for the same 
purpose. Multiple user scenarios are widely discussed and common-pool resources 
(CPR) are defined for multiple user situations. Generally, goods and resources can be 
categorised for subtractability and possibilities to exclude others, see Ostrom, Gardner 
and Walker (1994, 7). Common-pool resources are of special interest because the 
exclusion of others is difficult and subtractibility is high.  
The case of multiple use and CPR is not the focus of current literature although the 
pressure on a CPR, described in the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ (Hardin 1968) or in 
‘Governing the Commons’ (Ostrom 1990), can include very different dynamics 
considering multiple use options. We will analyse the connection of multiple use 
opportunities and CPR in section 8 with the example of privately owned land that is 
used for grazing. All blocks of land are at a river and its riparian zone is crucial for 
the biodiversity in the whole region. It is obvious that biodiversity is a CPR. 
Additionally, we will consider tourism operators that try to locate areas for tours, 
which depend highly on the biodiversity of the region. Tourism as an income option 
becomes in this context a second CPR. The link between the two CPRs and the 
privately owned land is multiple use. The land owners act as individuals. All owners 
form together with the resource and the institutional arrangement the system.  
In order to analyse institutional arrangements in the context of multiple use we first 
develop the theoretical background of institutional arrangements. After that we will 
focus on individuals and learning as their dynamic dimension, followed by the system 
in an evolutionary game-theoretical approach. 
4.  Institutional arrangements in a theoretical context 
Institutional issues were for a long time not included in economic research as the main 
problem allowing a broad aggregation of economic entities and activities. Neo-
classical approaches focused on the understanding of the fundamental context of   4
market mechanisms and market results. For this reason these scholars were able to 
make restrictive assumptions about human behaviour. The rationally acting homo 
oeconomicus with perfect information dominated economic research. Young (1998) 
puts the focus of neoclassical theory in this way, “Neoclassical economics describes 
the way the world looks once the dust has settled; we are interested in how the dust 
goes about settling.” In other words, the world does not switch from one general 
equilibrium to the next; transitions exist, dust exists. These evolving interests changed 
the focus from this principle of general equilibria as an attractor, towards institutional 
aspects. Nowadays institutional theories provide some of the most important 
approaches used to explain economic issues.  
This development commenced with Coase (1937) where the idea of transaction costs 
was introduced. Coase (1960) and Hayek (1960) improved the conceptual foundation 
to consider institutions in economic research. Since then several disciplines have had 
an important impact on the direction of institutional economics, namely philosophy, 
political science, and social science. While the New Institutional Economics provided 
a solid theoretical framework for the understanding of institutions and transaction 
costs, the focus shifted towards possibilities of applying this work. This shift paved 
the way particularly towards (evolutionary) game-theoretic approaches.  
Coase (1937) begins with the organisation of market processes and addresses the 
question as to why companies organise some of their activities inside (‘make’ 
position) and others outside (‘buy’ position) of their organisational structure. Coase 
uses the existence and importance of transaction costs and institutions to explain the 
real world and stimulating economic research in a significant way. Williamson (1998) 
structures Coase work in a very useful way: In his paper ‘The Nature of the Firm’ 
(1937) Coase focuses on institutions of governance, which can be called the play of 
the game, while his paper ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) analyses the 
institutional environment, the rules of the game.  
Williamson (1985) focuses on transaction costs and distinguishes between 
Institutional Economics (eg. Commons, 1931) and New Institutional Economics. He 
comes to the conclusion that “any relation, economic or otherwise, that takes the form 
of or can be described as a contracting problem, can be evaluated to advantage in 
transaction cost economic terms.” (Williamson 1985, 387) Therefore, according to 
Williamson all actions between different parties can be seen as transactions and these 
transactions result in costs.  
Transaction costs have to be seen in connection with the rules those transaction 
follow, see Williamson (1998). North (1993b) defines institutions as “rules of a game 
of a society or formally [institutions] are the human-devised constraints that structure 
human interaction.” These rules can be formal, like statute law, common law and 
regulations, informal, like conventions, norms of behaviour or codes of conduct, or 
they can incorporate “the enforcement characteristics of both” (North, 1993c). 
Institutions exist because of the need to reduce transaction costs. This means that 
lower transaction costs are, the more efficient institutions work (North 1993c). The 
institutional framework defines the constraints for the maximisation of an 
organisation’s economic performance.  
Institutional change may be a result of changes in formal rules or informal constraints. 
North (1993a) defines five propositions about institutional change: 
•  The key for institutional change is the interaction between institutions and 
organisations in a competitive setting.   5
•  To survive in this competitive setting organisations have to invest in skills and 
knowledge. 
•  The institutional setting provides incentives that dictate the kinds of skills and 
knowledge perceived to have the maximum pay-off. 
•  Perceptions are derived from the mental constructs of the players. 
•  Economics of scope, complementarities, and network externalities of an 
institutional matrix make institutional change overwhelming incremental and 
path dependent. 
In this approach organisations are groups of individuals, see North (1993b), and can 
be political bodies, economic bodies, social bodies, or educational bodies. As 
mentioned previously, competition is a crucial aspect for the development of 
institutions. “While learning is a result of curiosity, the rate of learning will reflect the 
intensity of competition amongst organisations”(North 1993b, 6).  The  concept  of 
learning will play a critical role in a later stage of this paper. In addition, North (1991 
and 1997) emphasises the importance of path dependency: Whereby the cultural 
heritage and the specific historical experience of the economy determines institutional 
change. “Changing merely the formal rules will produce the desired results only when 
the informal norms are complementary to that rule change, and enforcement is either 
perfect or at least consistent with the expectations of those altering the rules ” (North 
1997, 3). 
Williamson (1985) identifies three variables as the main drivers for transaction costs: 
asset-specificity, uncertainty, and frequency. These variables provide two essential 
drivers for another research field within the area of institutional economics: the focus 
on property rights and contracts. The fact that asset-specific investment decisions 
have to be made under uncertainty leads to the possibility of investment protection. 
These drivers are highly relevant because in most cases information is unequally 
distributed; one party has more information than the other one. This leads to a closer 
view on contracts, see, for instance, Williamson (2000). In order for it to be feasible 
to have different possibilities to securing investment we must assume that there are 
visible differences in owning property and the kind of rights, which are connected to 
this ownership. Demsetz (1967) and Aichian and Demsetz (1972 and 1973) founded 
the basis for property rights theory. 
Demsetz (1967) states that “property rights specify how persons may be benefited and 
harmed, and, therefore, who must pay whom to modify the actions taken by persons.” 
With this definition he develops the concept of distinguishing the need for property 
rights from that of the existence of externalities. This allowed Demsetz (1967) to 
develop a dynamic definition of property rights as they change in order to minimise 
externalities in a dynamic environment. These externalities can be seen in an inter- or 
intra-generational perspective, similar to the concept of sustainable development. If 
the community owns the property, it is possible that present generations may overuse 
the connected resources as future generations are underrepresented in decisions about 
the intensity of use. In addition, the presence of multiple-users can increase 
transaction costs in a dramatic way, especially by creating free rider problems (see 
Aichian and Demsetz 1973), and undermining negotiations about the optimal use.  
At the same time however, private property can cause various investments not to be 
undertaken if they are outside the range of the perspective of an individual. The 
greater the numbers of private owners, the higher transaction costs are to arrange 
investment that increases the overall benefit. Property rights will be modified over   6
time in such a way so that “negotiating and policing costs will be compared to costs 
that depend on the scale of ownership, and parcels of land will tend to be owned in 
sizes which minimize the sum of these costs.” (Demsetz 1967, 358) These aspects are 
considered in Aichian and Demsetz (1973) from another perspective, whereby the 
value of an organisational structure is equated with the transaction costs it saves. This 
approach corresponds with Coase’s (1937) initial theory that as a result of the 
existence of transaction costs, (different) organisations exist.  
The theoretical discussion provides the understanding of institutions. An applied 
analysis of a real-world case illustrated in the project described in section 2 requires 
not only the ability to analyse a situation qualitatively but also a base for a simulative 
capacity with which to evaluate effects of changes. This simulative dimension is 
covered by different quantitative approaches. For instance, Johnson, Kaufman and 
Zoido-Lobatón (1999), Hellman and Kaufmann (2003) or Beck et al. (2000) use 
econometric instruments to work on different elements of institutional arrangements 
in order to measure the quality of institutions. Another approach is the modification of 
game-theoretic approaches for institutional issues. In this paper we will focus on 
agent-based models. Before we develop the game-theoretical framework for our 
model, we discuss in the following section, the question about how to model 
individuals and their behaviour as defining agents in a game is a crucial step. 
5.  Micro-level: Learning and adapting individuals 
The field of constitutional economics is related to political economics, public choice 
theory or public law and implements the normative perspective on market behaviour 
and results. A core question is, as cited above, “Why do persons choose rules that 
seem to constrain or limit their choices?” (Buchanan and Yoon 1999, 1). Rawls 
(1971) developed the theory of justice as fairness, used in the first framework of this 
research field, by analysing the normative perspective of action choice. Normative 
means that there is a perception about ethically right and wrong behaviour, which is 
mainly defined by Rawls’ criterion of reciprocity:  
“Citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and equal in a 
system of cooperation over generations, they are prepared to offer one another 
fair terms of social cooperation... and they agree to act on those terms, even at 
the cost of their own interests in particular situations, provided that others also 
accept those terms. For those terms to be fair terms, citizens offering them must 
reasonably think that those citizens to whom they are offered might also 
reasonably accept them.” (Rawls 1996, XLIV) 
This approach has to be seen in the tradition of Kant who founded the theory 
regarding the deduction of ethical principles from rationality. On this theoretical basis 
stands also the Frankfurt School of thought, with popular representatives like Adorno 
and Habermas, and Luhman, who founded the system theory. This German scholar 
emphasises the difference between action as individual behaviour and rules or, as 
Homann (1997) defines it, between the constitutive and the operational level. 
Economic incentives only determine rules directly and not the action of an individual 
that underlies the rules in this approach, strictly. This means that individual behaviour 
is bound to rules and as they are complementary to economic incentives, the rules are 
self-enforcing. The reliability of individual behaviour is therefore not given by the 
moral commitment of the individuum as Kant defined, but by the definition of 
complementary rules, see Homann (1997).   7
This approach implements the same mechanism that the game theoretical approach 
develops and states, as Hobbes points out in Leviathan, that a rule can only be 
enforced if all parties accept the rule. This theory confirms the context of path 
dependency described by North (1997), mentioned above. As Homann (1997) states, 
the normative validity of a rule depends on sufficient implementation and it is the 
implementation that provides the validity.  
The question is how can rules be influenced or created that are acceptable and at the 
same time allow a sustainable use of common-pool resources. Firstly, it has to be 
stated that the concept of sustainability was developed from the tradition of social 
justice, which was primarily moulded by Rawls. Secondly, the individual acceptance 
depends on individual goals. Most economists help themselves and simplify reality by 
assuming a homo oeconomicus. But as we have seen above, constitutional economics 
allows a broader view on the motivation of individual behaviour. Schramm (1997) 
gives a systematic view of the different approaches on the extent to which individual 
behaviour is dominated by economic incentives or ethical considerations and states 
that there is no consensus on this in normative theories.  
This makes it difficult to step from a normative analysis to a positive one and it is no 
surprise that Voigt (1997) concludes that there has not been a great deal of research 
done in positive constitutional economics. However the comparison of alternative 
institutional arrangements requires a positive approach: “Comparing institutional 
analysis asks how alternative institutional arrangements effect (economic) outcomes.” 
(Voigt 1997, 19) This does not mean that only existing institutional arrangements can 
be compared but comparisons may also be made to possible arrangements with an 
empirical reference, as developed by laboratory settings. An essential element in such 
an empirical approach must be the evaluation of individual behaviour and the extent 
to which it is driven by economic incentives on the one hand and ethical 
considerations on the other. Without this knowledge the definition of complementary 
rules would be part of a trial-and-error process.  
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) state that every individual will try to minimise its’ own 
costs in the choice of an institutional arrangement: “For a given activity the fully 
rational individualist, at the time of constitutional choice, will try to choose that 
decision-making rule which will minimize the present value of the expected costs that 
he must suffer.” (Buchanan  and  Tullock  1962,  70) This approach shows a clear 
emphasis on economic incentives in the individual’s action choice. Buchanan and 
Tullock limit this optimisation behaviour not only to material goods but include also 
immaterial effects and thereby explain institutional/constitutional aspects using 
economic mechanisms. The individual decision weighs up reduced possibilities and 
increased conditions. In later works Buchanan shifts from a position dominated by 
homo oeconomicus to a morally constrained one (bounded rationality).  
Buchanan and Yoon (1999) state that there are three reasons for individuals to create 
rules. The first one is to reduce the temptation to behave how the individual feels they 
should not behave. The second reason is to reduce the complexity of the decision 
making process. The third reason is to “constrain collective actions that might be 
undertaken without the explicit consent of the individual who evaluates her role as a 
participant  in  post-constitutional  politics.”  (Buchanan and Yoon 1999, 211)  This 
dynamic perspective gives a significant meaning to constituting the institutional 
arrangement from an individual perspective. An alternative approach is presented by 
Hayek (1973 and 1979), who defines rules pertaining to institutions as the result of 
cultural evolution. The connection between the community level of (cultural) 
evolution and the level of individuals is obvious. Therefore we analyse in the   8
following section learning mechanisms on the individual’s level and interpret them as 
a driver for the evolution of rules at a community level. 
Evolution of rules refers to the incorporation of individual incentives (long-term and 
short-term optimisation). On the basis of their objectives, individuals perceive their 
environment and changes to their environment and they learn to recognise particular 
elements, how these elements are connected and where the drivers are. Therefore, an 
applied model has to implement a context-specific learning mechanism. Learning can 
take place on an individual level or on a group level. 
The three elements Tesfatsion (2001, 292) lists point out two levels and, as the core 
point of this analysis, the link between the two of them. The agent adaptation is 
focused on the dynamics at an individual level. Learning incorporates the process of 
delivering the feedback from the system to the individual. The evolution of a system 
requires the analysis of drivers of a change of this system, for instance, the 
institutional arrangement. The latter point includes the feedback coming from the 
individual level, as individual’s behaviour is a main driver for a change in the system. 
Young (1998) puts his analysis of learning under the title “Individual Strategy and 
Social Structure” which describes the same levels.  
In reality this is an ongoing process of (1) signals perceived and processed by the 
individual and (2) feedback given to the system which is processed on that level and 
produces changes. Crucial for the application of agent-based models in real-world 
case studies is the definition of these two dynamic mechanisms. Before we discuss the 
possibilities to define mechanism (2) we will discuss the different learning 
mechanisms, which defines point (1). 
Young (1998, 27-28) summarises the variety of learning mechanisms into four main 
groups.  Natural selection, describes an evolution where those agents with high 
payoffs have a higher population than those agents with low payoffs and this is 
modelled in so-called replicator dynamics. Imitation means that agents copy 
successful strategies of other agents and focuses more obviously on the agent’s 
decision-making process rather than on natural selection. Regardless of other agents’ 
behaviour,  reinforcement dynamics are based on the agent’s own payoff. This 
mechanism defines the experience link between the chosen strategy and the yielded 
payoff of an agent for their present strategy choice. The fourth learning mechanism is 
best reply in which the agent compares the outcome of different combinations of their 
own strategies with those of other agents in so-called fictitious plays. This mechanism 
implements very different approaches regarding how far the agent is able to forecast 
and process another’s strategies.  
Fudenberg and Levine (1998) give an overview of different mechanisms of so-called 
sophisticated learning mechanisms. An essential approach for our problem is the 
consideration of reputation. Reputation describes a mechanism where by past actions 
of an agent determine the expectations held by other agents. Additionally, reputation 
can describe a situation where one agent behaves in a myopic fashion and the other 
agent has a competent understanding of the effects the strategies that both agents have 
of the system.  
 A  B 
A 10/10  0/0 
B 0/0  1/1 
 
The sophisticated agent will try to teach the other agent to choose strategy A, which 
maximises the payoff of both players. In a Stackelberg game A/A would be the 
solution for all periods if the rational player moves first. Fudenberg and Levine (1998,   9
264-266) demonstrated that this outcome depends highly on the difference between 
the payoffs of A and B as well as on the behaviour of the myopic agent. In a noisy 
environment – the myopic agent tends to randomise their strategy choice – it becomes 
reasonable that both agents behave myopically.  
The existence of a rational player simplifies the game and its learning mechanism. 
Kreps and Wilson (1982) analyse a game with reputation and imperfect information. 
In a game where a possible entrant faces a monopolist and the entrant doesn’t know 
about the monopolist’s payoff function, beliefs become a function of the monopolist’s 
reputation. The equilibrium of the game depends highly on beliefs and Kreps and 
Wilson (1982) show that solutions like the chain-store paradox1 (Selten 1978) only 
appear when the reaction of the monopolist is defined as common knowledge. Under 
imperfect information other equilibria result. While Fudenberg and Levine (1998) 
give a broad overview on existing learning mechanisms, Chen and Khoroshilov 
(2003) focus on learning under imperfect information. Their simulations show that the 
implementation of beliefs, like in experience-weighted attraction learning in Camerer 
and Ho (1999), leads to less stability than in reinforcement models because the agents 
keep all strategies over all stages active. Camerer and Ho (1999) formulate with their 
learning mechanism a bridge between fictitious games modified with weighted beliefs 
and reinforcement models. This approach defines the strategy choice as a function of 
expected payoffs. These expected payoffs depend on (1) the periodical payoff as a 
function of their own strategy and the strategies chosen by the other agents, and (2) 
the agent’s belief. This belief depends on the strategies the agent perceives other 
agents have chosen.  
Oechssler and Schipper (2003, 137) point out what Harsanyi (1967, FN2) stated much 
earlier; there is for more extensive research done in the field of (learning with) 
imperfect information than (with) incomplete information.2 Our problem falls into the 
category of incomplete information.  
With the goal of modelling real-world learning processes, some analyses try to find 
learning mechanisms for games with incomplete information and mixed strategies 
with the help of experiments. Such approaches look for patterns to describe dynamics 
in observed data. Erev and Roth (1998) develop a reinforcement mechanism and 
combine it with forgetting and experimenting to explain changes in the strategy choice 
of agents. Sarin and Vahid (2001) work on the same data as Erev and Roth (1998) and 
develop a simple repeated game to explain the learning process. Oechssler and 
Schipper (2003) collect their own data in experimental situations, focussing on the 
approach of Kalai and Lehrer (1995) to define subjective Nash equilibria. In such a 
subjective view one agent can realise a single equilibrium while another agent 
perceives multiple equilibria. Following this approach, the main question is whether 
or not agents learn to perceive a game correctly. Their experiment compared the 
ability of agents to guess the payoff function of the other agent over the range of 
different games. Although this ability often does not seem to be very high, the games 
are close to Nash equilibrium. This is important for our problem, as according to Aoki 
(2001) a rule is established in form of equilibrium. Oechssler and Schipper (2003) 
                                                 
1   The chain-store paradox describes the game between a monopolist and an entrant. Assumed that fighting the entrant is 
combined with negative payoff, the monopolist won’t fight in the last stage of a finite multi-stage game. Rolling backwards 
this argument is valid for every stage of the game and the monopolist doesn’t fight the entrant and the entrant enters. (Selten 
1978) 
2  “The distinction between games with complete and incomplete information (between C-games and I-games) must not be 
confused with that between games with perfect and imperfect information. By common terminology convention, the first 
distinction always refers to the amount of information the players have about the rules of the game, while the second refers to 
the amount of information they have about the other players’ and their own previous moves (and about previous chance 
moves).”(Harsanyi 1967, FN2)   10
compare the reinforcement learning in Erev and Roth (1998, 859-862) with that of 
Sarin and Vahid (2001) and find that both describe their data reasonably well.  
In addition to learning about other agents, individuals learn by perceiving and 
processing effects of nature. Dekel, Fudenberg and Levine (2002) focus on learning 
about nature’s moves and on the existence of equilibria. Modelling a real-world 
situation means that individual learning has to implement an agent’s own and others’ 
behaviour as well as nature’s moves. Before an agent-based model will be specified 
the following section provides a game-theoretical base. 
6.  Connectivity: Games, rules and strategy 
In this section we will use game theory to analyse institutional changes and develop a 
quantitative method to formulate simulative capacity with which to evaluate policy 
decisions. Game theory primarily uses the expression rules according to strategies. 
Every agent has an action choice, which contains the different strategies the agent can 
choose from.  
Harsanyi (1967) uses rules as a term for the model specifications, which comes close 
to the definitions given above. He uses rules to define the difference between games 
with complete and incomplete information: They differ “in the fact that some or all of 
the players lack full information about ‘rules’ of the game… For example, they may 
lack full information about other players’ or even their own payoff functions, about 
physical facilities available to other players or even themselves, about the amount of 
information the other players have about various aspects of the game situation, etc.” 
Harsanyi (1967) use of rules is on a different level to that of strategies and his rules 
correspond with those of Coase (1960) and North (1993b). 
By this definition, rules and norms are seen to be on a higher level than strategies as 
rules and norms are defined by a group rather than on an individual level. While a 
strategy can be “Pump 20 l/min” and another one “Pump 100 l/min” a rule has the 
form “No individual is allowed to pump more than 50 l/min at all times from aquifer 
X or else he gets fined by local police”. Formal and informal rules restrict the 
individual action choice. 
Crawford and Ostrom (1995) define in their Grammar for institutions a general 
structure of rules for institutional statements. These are built from the elements of 
attributes, deontic, aim, conditions and or else. Their examples is (see Crawford and 
Ostrom 1995, 584)  





let their animals trample 
the irrigation channels 
at all 
times 
or else the village who owns the 
livestock will be levied a fine.” 
 
Mittenzwei and Bullock (2001, 10) add the enforcing mechanism as a sixth element: 
attribute  deontic  aim  conditions  or else  enforcing  
“The 
landlord 
must   pay a reward r
2=ay+b 




or else the landlord 
has to pay a fine c 
being levied 
by a court.” 
 
These rules restrict the individual strategy choice, which leads to the question in 
Buchanan and Yoon (1999, 1.) “Why do persons choose rules that seem to constrain 
or limit their choices?” If, for instance, the short-term optimising view of individuals 
has an ecological footprint, which does not conform to social preferences, institutional 
arrangements like rules will be formed to avoid unsustainable behaviour. Ostrom 
(2003) structures rules in a very useful way by stating that rules have to be seen in the   11
context of (1) enforcement and (2) moral behaviour. Enforcement is the essential 
point Eggertsson (1997) sees for individual behaviour. Harsanyi (1969) delivers 
another useful definition of the two core drivers for incentives: “People’s behaviour 
can largely be explained in terms of two dominant interests: economic gain and social 
acceptance.” Fehr and Falk (2002) point out the importance of the social approval of 
individual behaviour and stress the importance of feedback effects as the presence of 
approval motives may lead to permanent negative effects on rule compliance. Feige 
(1998, 8) and Leitzel (1997) point out that formal rules can be perceived as bad rules. 
This maintains an essential dynamic because, as Aoki (2001) states, changes in 
institutional arrangements are (merely) caused by disequilibria if incentives for 
individuals don’t match with formal (or informal) rules. This may lead to a process 
that changes the formal (or informal) rule. The institutional arrangement defines how 
this disequilibrium is solved, and, how the level of individuals transforms the group 
level.  
The three main questions are therefore: 
•  What preferences do individuals have? 
•  How are these interests organised on a group level?  
•  How are these rules enforced? 
The first question is in the domain of constitutional economics and was discussed in 
section 5. The second question refers to the process of formulating informal and 
formal rules, while the third question is concerned with the organisation of the rules’ 
enforcement. While we assume for our case that the enforcement of rules happens 
endogenously in a small system by social pressure and monitoring is not necessary, 
the following section focuses on the second point, the evolution of rules. 
7.  Macro level: Evolving rules and adapting systems 
Games based on common-pool resources focus primarily on user behaviour. Game-
theoretic literature covers varied implementations of behavioural change. One scholar 
defines it as a dynamic game with incomplete information, and they analyse questions 
like moral reputation, moral hazard or signalling. The second scholar follows the 
biological interpretation of evolutionary games. Friedman (1991, 637) defines 
evolutionary games as games where “each individual chooses among alternative 
actions or behaviours whose payoff or fitness depends on the choice of others. Over 
time the distribution of observed behaviour in a population evolves, as fitter strategies 
become more prevalent.”  
The dissimilarity between the two approaches is expressed quite differently by a 
number of authors. Friedman (1996, 1) points out that “Strategic interactions over 
time can be modelled as an evolutionary game if the players do not systematically 
attempt to influence other players’ future actions and if the distribution of players’ 
action changes gradually.” However, Gintis (2000, 211) sees the difference through 
another perspective: While traditional game theory analyses, for instance, the fight 
between a predator and its prey, evolutionary game theory focuses on how predators 
“fight among themselves for the privilege of having their offspring occupy the 
predator niche in the next period and improve their chances by catching more prey.” 
In this sense the same game can be set up in an evolutionary way. As our main focus 
is institutions (equilibria) as an effect of changes in behaviour, Fudenberg and Tirole 
(1991, 28) give a relevant statement on the application of Nash equilibria: “It can be   12
used to discuss the adjustment of population fractions by evolution as opposed to 
learning.”  
In our game with common-pool resources the rules evolve on a Meta level. As rules 
determine the availability of strategies, the action choice evolves according to 
equilibria at the level of rules. While this Meta level is modelled in an evolutionary 
process the individuals change their knowledge, attitude and expectation in 
accordance with their learning. For this reason learning was discussed as an overview 
in section 5. In this section we will stay at the level of rules of the game. If the aim is 
to interpret equilibrium (as the outcome) of a game as an institution, we have to 
acknowledge the existence of two different equilibrium concepts, the Nash 
equilibrium and the Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS).  
Maynard Smith and Price (1973) and Maynard Smith (1982) combine the 
mathematical approach with the biological perspective and develop an evolutionary 
concept of equilibria in games. Species have strategies in the form of their genotypic 
variants and in repeated, random pairing of players an (evolving) equilibrium results. 
Perturbations occur by mutations. A strategy (genotype) is evolutionarily stable if the 
mutant cannot invade the species. Taylor and Jonker (1978) proved that an ESS is 
sufficient for stability in dynamic games. Young (1998, 44-65) discusses dynamic and 
stochastic stability of such equilibria and Gintis (2000, 150) provides the link to 
traditional (and modified) Nash equilibria: “A Nash equilibrium in an evolutionary 
game can consist of a monomorphic population of agents, each playing the same 
mixed strategy, or as a polymorphic population, a fraction of the population playing 
each of the underlying pure strategies in proportion to its contribution to the mixed 
Nash strategy.”  
Friedman (1996) analyses experimental results of equilibria in evolutionary games. 
He uses the Hawk-Dove game and confirms the assumed small group effect that 
agents will seldom try to influence the other agents’ behaviour. Kantian behaviour 
(behave how you expect others to behave – cooperative attitude) dominates games in 
groups with up to 6 persons playing Prisoner’s Dilemma. (At the same time this 
experiment shows when large games begin.) 
The discussion of equilibria leads to the core point of institution modelling. This step 
analyses the possibilities of interpreting equilibrium as a rule. While most of the work 
on institutional patterns assumes rules to be given (exogenously), game-theoretical 
approaches, especially the evolutionary field, focus on dynamic aspects of institutions 
and assume that rules are the result of behaviour. This means that a rule can be 
defined technically as equilibrium of the behaviour of different agents. Excellent 
introductions to the game-theoretic approach of institutional economics are Aoki 
(2001) and Young (1998).  
Hurwicz (1994) sets up a non-cooperative multi-stage game with a finite number of 
moves and n players and uses the resulting decision tree in the extensive form game to 
show how end nodes and branches can be used for institutional reasons. Branches can 
be used to analyse transaction costs, while end nodes demonstrate which moves result 
in a Nash equilibria.  
Mittenzwei and Bullock (2001) build on this approach and set up a similar game, 
which they call Game with Institutions. In their approach an institution player exists 
and is dealt similar to nature as a non-player. The game is defined on three levels: 
The first level is called institution forming, the second institution applying, and the 
third, institution dependent. Players and Nature play on the first and third level, while 
the institution player plays (strategically) on the second level. An institution is 
presented as the strategy, the institutional player makes their choice on the second   13
level which then determines the action choice on the third level and therefore also 
(together with Nature’s move on level three) the players’ outcome. The location of the 
driver for the institution player and the strategies this non-player can choose from 
remain open.  
Aoki (2001, 10) characterises institutions as “a self-sustaining system of shared 
beliefs about a salient way in which a game is repeated.” With this approach he 
distinguishes between the equilibrium-of-the-game view, which is based on 
evolutionary game scholar, from the rules-of-the-game scholar (for instance Hurwicz 
















Figure 1: Game-theoretical approach to systemise institutions, see Aoki (2001) 
 
Aoki (2001) visualises this evolutionary approach by Figure 1. Institutions are 
constituted by beliefs of agents and are (partially) coordinated by summary 
representations. Summary representations stand for compressed information which 
agents take as given. On the basis of these beliefs the agents chose their strategies, in 
other words, the strategies are constrained by the beliefs. Jointly the strategies of all 
agents constitute equilibrium. This equilibrium of agreed strategies confirms the 
summary representation (compressed information). 
The sets of environments Ε ˆ , with  Ε ∈ ˆ ε , and the environment-dependent equilibrium 
paths  () e s
∗  and  () e s
∗ ∗  are represented by the compressed information (summary 
representations) 
∗ Σ  and 
∗ ∗ Σ . The equilibrium path  ( ) e s
∗  or  ( ) e s
∗ ∗  is generated by the 
summary representation 
∗ Σ  respectively 
∗ ∗ Σ and ‘residual private information’ 
() ( ) e s Ii
∗ ∗ , with  () () ( )
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ Σ =∑ ~
i i e s e s I . In this process the equilibrium paths 
themselves reaffirm the compressed information 
∗ Σ , which reproduces the institution. 
In this dynamic the institution becomes self-sustaining on Ε ˆ . The agents have no 
direct control over institutions. The summary representation (compressed 
information) coordinates the agents’ expectations and helps them to find the 
‘corresponding’ strategy (action choice).  
But what if the results of each game are not in accordance with expectations? This can 
occur as a result of external shifts such as technological innovations, environmental 
threats, by internal cumulative issues from distribution effects (eg. power, assets) or 
mutant strategies. Aoki uses this argument to differentiate the subject cognition 
(which defines the subjective stage of the game) from the general cognition. If enough 
expectations differ from the games’ result it is possible to get a general cognitive 
disequilibrium. Such disequilibrium instigates the search for new strategies. These 
new strategies are in contradiction to the shared beliefs and through this learning 
process, new institutions are developed based on subjective game models.   14
8.  Model specification and scenario results 
8.1.  General approach 
Based on the evolutionary game-theoretical approach, we develop in this section a 
model for the context of CPR and multiple use issues. In order to develop simulative 
capacity for a real-world situation we do not describe the decision making process by 
differential equations (see for this area of game-theory Fudenberg and Tirole 1991, 
521; or Gintis 2000, 164-187)) but using an agent-based (or rule-based) approach. 
Agent-based models (ABM) or agent-based computational economics (ACE) allow 
analysis of “evolving systems of autonomous interacting agents” (Tesfatsion 2001, 
281). As Deadman (1999, 161-162) points out, ABM defines a bottom-up approach 
and instead of defining the overall behaviour “this overall behaviour emerges as a 
result of the actions and interactions of the individual agents.” The modeller defines 
the initial conditions of the game, which includes, for instance, how many agents exist 
in the first period, and how much of a common-pool resource is available. Critical for 
the specification is the definition of strategies for each of the agents (action choice) as 
well as the if-then conditions. “The result is a complicated dynamic system of 
recurrent causal chains connecting agents’ behaviours, interaction networks, and 
social welfare outcomes” (Tesfatsion 2002, 1). In-depth descriptions of ABM can be 
found in, for instance, Holland and Miller (1991) and Holland (1992). 
In this approach we will apply an agent-based model to mimic the evolution of rules 
as institutions and include the context of multiple use. Crucial for our problem is the 
mechanisms that drive the dynamics of the system, which includes the common-pool 
resource. Tesfatsion (2001, 292) raises in this context an important question: “How 
should agent adaptation, learning, and evolution be constructively represented in these 
artificial economic worlds?” We worked in the previous sections on these three 
elements placed on two levels. In the following part we will define an agent-based 
model for the project, described in section 2. 
8.2.  Context 
As we focus our modelling exercise on multiple-use issues in combination with a 
common-pool dilemma, we have to include diverging interests in the use of one 
resource. In this case we assume the scenario of six ranchers leasing blocks of land 
along a river in Australia’s outback. The leases are long-term leases of twenty years 
and give the owners property rights regarding land use, whereby water resources are 
excluded. Seasonal rainfall varies and has a significant impact on the carrying 
capacity for cattle on the paddocks. All ranchers are part of a local community and 
connected by a social network. Seasonal rainfall leads with a high likelihood to river 
flooding which enriches the ecological system along riparian zones. Unfenced 
vegetation in riparian zone also attracts grazing cattle and diminishes rapidly the 
variety of plants, which leads to an erosion of the rivers bank and has a negative 
accumulative impact on biodiversity issues. Apart from this, the riparian zones 
biodiversity in this Outback area also depends on the vegetation in the paddocks. 
Overgrazed paddocks mean a direct decrease of biodiversity (flora) and may lead 
indirectly to a decrease in fauna such as emus and brolgas.  
An increasing amount of tourists along the east coast of Australia has lead to the 
development of additional strategies in the tourism sector. Outback activities like 
wildlife spotting, embedded in longer overnight trips, appears to be a promising 
emerging niche. As these activities require no stationary investment and depend on   15
buses and tents only, the tourism operators are highly mobile and choose those areas 
with the best wildlife – including icon species – and areas with more cooperative land 
owners.  
8.3.  Formal description 
Agents and strategies 
Generally, the i agents with  n i ,.., 1 =  have a strategy choice 
t




ij s Σ ∈  and 
m j ,.., 1 = , with m  as the number of strategies. In a multi-stage game the agents move 
simultaneously (normal form game). The two main control variables in the action 
choice of the agents are ‘fencing the riparian zone’ 
t
i FC  and ‘number of cattle’ 
t
i L . 
All ranchers start with ‘no fencing’ as fencing is linked with costs of $1,000. The 
ranchers have to decide before the start of the wet season on the number of cattle. 
Their decision is based in this first instance on last year’s rainfall. We assume a 
rainfall indictor 
t Ψ  from 0 (no rain) to 150 (heavy rainfalls). In this community it is 
common knowledge that each paddock can carry a livestock level of 600 cattle at an 
average rainfall indicator of 75. Each rancher needs a minimum livestock level of 200 
cattle to secure the minimum income for their family. Even in very wet years the 
paddocks cannot carry more than 1,000 cattle. Therefore, the ranchers’ decision 
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The common-pool resource biodiversity at the beginning of the next period 
1 + Θ
t  is a 
function of the chosen strategies, Nature’s (stochastic) move 
t Ψ  and the biodiversity 
level in the current period 
t Θ ;  ( )
t t t
ij
t s f Θ Ψ = Θ
+ , ,
1 . As the agents’ strategy choice is 
based on the two control variables, fencing and livestock, we can define a specified 
function of 
t Θ : We assume biodiversity to be a function of the riparian zone 
t
i RZ , the 
livestock on the paddock 
t
i L , rainfall 
t Ψ  and the binary variable ‘fencing’ 
1 − t
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In case of unfenced riparian zones, biodiversity accumulates at a lower rate of 0.85. 
The second term describes the influence of the riparian zone; a decrease of riparian 
vegetation has a negative impact in biodiversity and an increase compared to the 
starting value of 1,000 has a positive impact on biodiversity. As a maximal vegetation   16
of riparian zones we restrict the index to 5,000 and the minimum to 0. The third term 
includes the stochastic impact of Nature’s move and the density of cattle in the 
paddock. Therefore, we implement the block of land itself as the second part of the 
ecosystem apart from the riparian zone. The maximum amount of livestock on all 
paddocks and no rainfall, depletes the basis for other species, while the minimal 
livestock and maximal rain biodiversity has a positive affect. In case of fenced 
riparian zones we assume a higher accumulation effect of 1. The two following terms 
remain unchanged. Essentially, the biodiversity is based on all paddocks as we can 
assume an interactive ecosystem. Therefore, it becomes a common-pool resource for 
the ranchers in this community. 
As a second CPR we consider potential tourism activities in the region. Tourism 
activities depend on the expected wildlife, whereby we assume that the operators get 
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i TA  are measured on a paddock scale. Operators offer tours in the 
regions twice a week. For the size of the paddocks in this case the operators see a 
maximum carrying capacity of two big busses per week. They plan an average of 25 
tourists per bus for locations with excellent biodiversity and 20 for a location with 
good biodiversity and 10 for locations with average wildlife. The tourism operators 
try to access excellent locations twice a week, paddocks with good biodiversity 
reputation once a week and paddocks with an average biodiversity index fortnightly. 
As tourists stay five days the farmer can claim in average $100 per tourist and 
guarantees therefore help in emergency and a visit to the farm. We assume strategic 
behaviour for tourism operators. As they are interested in a better product they only 
visit paddocks with fenced riparian zones.  
 
Learning 
At the beginning of every period the agents observe their own payoff of the last move 
1 − t
i π , Nature’s move 
1 − Ψ
t  and the condition of the common-pool resources 
t BD  and 
t







i BD TA s f , , ,Ψ = π  and, as  ( )
t t t
ij
t BD s f BD , ,
1 Ψ =
+ , that tomorrow’s payoff 
depends on the strategies of all i agents in t.  
As a result of this (best reply) learning process, agent i may want to influence other 
agents’ behaviour whose strategy choice has a negative external effect on i’s future 
payoff. One option is to influence the other agent in the form of reputation (see 
above). Let us assume that there are six agents. Two green ranchers (GR: #5-6) are 
willing to protect environmental issues like riparian zones as long as their income is 
high enough to maintain their land. The second type of rancher is money oriented 
(MO: #3-4) which means that if environmental protection helps increasing their profit 
they, for instance, fence riparian zones. The differences between GR’s and MO’s are 
(1) that Mo’s have no interest in environmental issues for their own sake and (2) that 
MO’s learn slower about environmental issues. The third type of ranchers are 
conservative and very risk avers (CR: #1-2).    17
As the attitude of the unsustainable agents do not allow a reaction on reputation as an 
additional learning process, the green agents flag their dissatisfaction with the rules 
that allow the unsustainable agents to overuse the resource. Let us emphasise this 
important mechanism: In the first moment, the green agents are discontent with the 
behaviour of MO’s and CR’s but the learning process shows them that it is the rules 
that allow the other agents to behave in an unsustainable way. The flags reduce the 
fitness function of the rule that is connected with this particular behaviour and 
(supposed that there is a majority system established as part of a democratic structure) 
when the majority turns the rule down it will be replaced.  
At this stage we have to formalise the three main attributes, expectation, attitude and 
knowledge. Expectations are implemented as a set of beliefs 
t
i Ω  that are subjective 
and can change in time. Beliefs exist for Nature’s move, the future condition of the 






i s TA BD f , , , Ψ = Ω . As 
the learning process drives the evolutionary process on the group level, and the 
individual attitude is a dominant element for individual behaviour, this belief 
definition has to be refined. Attitude  i Φ  is a long-term element with important 
meaning for the dynamics and we assume that it won’t change in time (and therefore 
has to be treated as a parameter). This assumption implements path dependency (see 
North 1991 and 1997) in such ways that knowledge does not change the behaviour 
immediately, but includes attitudes as slow moving (in this case constant) variables, 
































Figure 2: Agent-based conceptualisation  
 
The essential influence of attitude is in the perception of new information. New 
information might be accepted as correct but if the agent’s goal is, for instance, 
connected with a short-term optimising strategy, any information about long-term 
effects might be ignored if the agent’s utility function contains only profit. Section 5 
discusses the importance of economic indicators for individual behaviour. Another 
way to distinguish the agents by their attitude towards sustainable development is the 
implementation of different discount rates. A green agent will discount future payoff 
by a much lower rate than other agents. In a differential approach this leads to a 
higher extraction rate of an unsustainable agent. Individual knowledge is driven by 







i j s TA BD f , , , ,Ψ Φ = Γ . From this point on we can define the individual’s beliefs 








i s TA BD f Γ Ψ = Ω , , , , . Figure 2 shows the 
general approach we use.  
In this approach every agent is described by its’ knowledge, attitude and expectation. 
This will allow us to cluster real-world data in order to identify similar agents. Agents 
can choose from a set of strategies (action choice) and behave in a certain way. This 
behaviour is interfered with by Nature’s move. The net result of all n behaviours and 
Nature’s move determines the equilibrium of the play. We interpret this equilibrium 
as a rule (formal or informal). The payoff leads, in connection with observed 
behaviour of other agents, Nature’s move and the change in common-pool resource, 
to a particular expectation of future possibilities of strategy choices. The agents learn 
that the condition of the common-pool resource (e.g. groundwater aquifer) can restrict 
strategy choices (e.g. irrigate and use land for agriculture) and this restriction can lead 
to a long-term degradation of payoffs (e.g. no more groundwater available). In this 
instance the agent and other respective players may disagree with what is expected 
(depends on the attitude) resulting in a disequilibrium. Technically, this agent flags 
his/her discontent and if the majority is dissatisfied with their subjective expectations 
the rule will be changed. This means the strategy choice of all agents receives new 
boundaries and one or more strategies can fall out of the action choice or become 
modified.  
The modification can be modelled in different ways. The appropriate approach would 
be to let the agents develop their own rules as is discussed in section 7. If the 
common-pool resource was an aquifer the agents should, for instance, think about 
changing rules in terms of the maximum amount of water that agents are permitted to 
pump. For such an approach the agents would have to calculate this amount. Such an 
approach is unlikely to occur if there are no predefined elements of choice in order to 
build rules. This leads us to the second option, which defines different sleeping 
elements agents can activate. In a more sophisticated manner, sleeping elements can 
approximate the eligible definition. Agents can experiment with different techniques 
such as using econometric approaches to calculate the optimal level of resource use. 
As in the real world, agents have to make a choice between different techniques to 
guide themselves through the unknown future. This means that the learning process 
will include the application of different rule-specifying techniques in a best reply 
manner on the level of evolving rules. 
We assume in our model the existence of an econometric approach in addition to 
calculating sustainable levels of use which are based on the number of cattle on a 
paddock and the expected rain. This sustainable amount will be incorporated into an 
existing rule, which is valid for all agents independent from their behaviour and 
attitude. The definition and flexibility in changing rules depends on the knowledge 
existing in the community.  
As described above, learning takes place on the individual level. Learning leads to a 
change in the knowledge of the agents and can thereby lead to evolving beliefs. 







i j s TA BD f , , , ,Ψ Φ = Γ . 
We assume that consistent cause-effect patterns are realised by the agent if the same 
change in strategy choice combined with a certain observed direction of Nature’s 
move 
t Ψ  leads to the similar change of the common-pool resource 
t Θ  - we assumed 
i Φ  to be constant. This means if  0 ˆ <
t
j s  in reaction to  0 ˆ < Ψ = Ψ
t t dt d  leads to   19
0 ˆ > Θ
t  the agent identifies that fencing increases biodiversity along riparian zones 
and lower levels of livestock help in times of a drought to maintain biodiversity on the 
paddock. To simplify the model we define 
t
i Γ  as an integer variable and assume that 
in the case described above -  0 ˆ <
t
j s  (less unfenced areas and less livestock) and 
0 ˆ < Ψ
t  and  0 ˆ > Θ
t  - knowledge increases:  0 ˆ > Γ
t
i . In a discrete approach we can 
define learning as an accumulative process with  1




i  given 
1 − <
t t
j j s s  and 
1 − Ψ < Ψ
t t  and 
1 − Θ > Θ
t t . 
As described, the beliefs of agent i are defined as a function of knowledge, Nature’s 
move, the condition of the common-pool resource and the other agents’ strategy 






i s f Γ Θ Ψ = Ω , , , . Such an approach allows for definition of the dynamics 
of the beliefs, which are driven by the multiple aspects that the agent observes. Beliefs 
are context-specific. A user of the common-pool resource does not expect other 
agents to follow conservative strategies if there is no scarcity. In a situation where no 
knowledge exists about the effect of different strategies, agents would not expect 
other agents to choose conservative strategies, i.e., they will expect the other to put 
more livestock on the paddock if grass is available.  
The first stage learning is modelled as reinforcement dynamic. The agents identify 
patterns between their strategy choice and the following pairs of variables   
o  inquiries by tourism operators to access one of the paddocks and biodiversity,  
o  fencing and biodiversity, and  
o  the number of grazing cattle and biodiversity.  
This knowledge will lead to the development of an action choice on a Meta level, 
where agents try to influence other agents’ behaviour to remain or improve their 
future action choice concerning the payoff. This Meta level is similar to the general 
cognition and summary representation in Aoki (2001) but differs in one essential way: 
Each agent has the option to change the rules of the game, but this cannot be done 
alone. Rather it is accomplished through a change on the Meta level.  
Knowledge 
t
i Γ  is modelled as a stock that accumulates points. As mentioned, we 
assume two conservative ranchers (CR), two money oriented opportunists (MO) and 
two ecology oriented greens ranchers (GR). The learning process of these ranchers 
differs as the greens are assumed to be the fastest learners. They accumulate 1.5 times 
the points of the average, the MO’s accumulate with the factor 0.5 and the CR’s do 
not accumulate at all as their strategy is to stick exclusively to their old business.  
Assuming that democratic structure provides an effective result, the evolutionary 
process will minimise the absolute number of disequilibria on the individual level. 
Similar to this is a second strategy choice, whereby agents can flag their 
dissatisfaction with each rule. This corresponds with the approach mentioned above 
where the evolutionary process takes place on the community level, that is, on the 
level of rules. This means that rules are connected with a fitness function, which 
depends on the satisfaction of the agents.  
GR’s attitude  i Φ  is defined to be one for the others  i Φ  are assumed to be zero. While 
an increase in knowledge and understanding of the system leads to the definition of 
individual rules, the agent also expects other agents to follow similar rules. 
Dissatisfaction caused by contrary beliefs, motivate the agent (in this case just GR can 
become active) to flag their opinion. MO can become active by combining tourism 
activities (TA) and biodiversity (BD) as their dissatisfaction is caused by the negative 
externalities of CR. In fact, such a flagging means that the agent wants all agents to   20
follow this individual rule. In a democratic system the individual rules become 
socialised if the majority flags their unhappiness with the existing rule and agrees to 
follow another specified rule. According to Aoki (2001) flagging signals 
disequilibrium, and rules (on the community scale) evolve as a result of changes on 
the individual scale.  
By following this argument it can be seen that rules depend on the support of 
community members who are defined by their knowledge, attitude and beliefs. In 
game-theoretical terms a lower acceptance of an existing rule leads to a decrease in 
the fitness function of this rule. We simplify the model by defining the activity of 
rules as integer variables; formal or informal rules are either in place or not. The 
majority of community members decide if a rule is active or inactive.  
 
Scenarios 









































Figure 3: Results for scenario 1, (a) Indices for riparian zones (RZ) and rainfall;  
    (b) profit for each rancher and rainfall 
 
First, we simulate a scenario without learning agents. Figure 3 (b) shows the 
accumulation of discounted profit 
t
i π  (in figures PRi(t), discount factor: 5%) as lines 
(primary y-axis) over 200 periods (x-axis). The stochastic impulse 
t Ψ (rainfall) is 
shown as bars (secondary y-axis). The business reaches over time a value of $8.15 
Mio. Figure 3 (a) shows the development of riparian zones 
t
r RZ  as lines (primary y-
axis) under the same stochastic conditions (bars, for display reasons magnified by   21
factor 10). The index for 
t BD  is mainly zero as 
t
r RZ  are unfenced and extremely 
sparsely vegetated. Tourism operators do not enquire for access to the paddocks.  







































   



















PR3-4: Profit ranchers 3-4 (MO)
PR5-6: Profit ranchers 5-6 (GR)
PR5&6: Profit effect ranchers 5-6  (GR's)
PR3&4: Profit effect ranchers 3-4 (MO's)
ranifall (bars)
 
Figure 4: Results for scenario 2,  (a) Indices for riparian zones (RZ) and rainfall;  
 (b)  riparian  zones  (RZ), biodiversity (BD) and tourism activity (TA);  
  (c) rainfall and effect on profit for ranchers  
   22
In scenario 2 reinforcement learning occurs and we assume a threshold of 4 for the 
accumulated amount of knowledge points. This means that the agents have to identify 
the same pattern four times until they understand the connection and translate this 
pattern into their decision making process.  
Figure 4 (a) shows much higher levels of vegetation in riparian zones (RZ) along four 
paddocks. These paddocks belong to the green ranchers (RZ5 & RZ6) and the MO’s 
(RZ3 & RZ4). The effect of higher vegetation in riparian zones on biodiversity is very 
positive, as the grey area in (b) shows. With improving biodiversity tourism operators 
start to approach the fenced paddocks and, as (b) shows, becomes a regular activity, 
just interrupted by long dry periods. Both groups learn (in different extend) which 
leads to periodic fencing. This has a positive impact on the wildlife in the whole area 
as the increasing biodiversity index signals. Figure 4 (c) shows the difference between 
profits in scenario 1 and 2. As tourism operators only visit fenced properties the 
conservative ranchers do not increase their profits. The GR’s are able to increase their 
profits by up to $180,000 because they have the highest fencing rate. The MO’s learn 
much slower and fence less than the GR’s. Their profit increases by $73,000.  
 





































Figure 5: Results for scenario 3,  (a) Indices for riparian zones (RZ) and rainfall; 
 (b)  riparian  zones  (RZ), biodiversity (BD) and tourism activity (TA)    23
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Figure 6: Results for scenario 3, (c) rainfall and effect on profit for ranchers 
 
Figure 6 shows the results of scenario 3. In this scenario we analyse the effect of 
individual learning on institutional arrangements. We assume that the ranchers are 
part of the same social network which means that they can communicate, for instance, 
their discontent. The introduction of fictitious plays in the individual learning (best 
reply learning) means that the individuals realise that a change in the other agents’ 
behaviour would increase their own payoff. In other words, they realise the existence 
of externalities. This also means that in a pure reinforced learning environment none 
of the agents would become aware of externalities. Furthermore, we assume that 
individual knowledge is communicated on a community level. On this macro level the 
individual with identified negative externalities, flag their unhappiness. In a 
democracy this dynamic would lead to a decrease in the fitness function of a rule. 
This rule can have the form of an informal or a formal rule as well as a norm. The 
assumptions require only that the agents follow the rule. We assume that the small 
size of the community is enough (social) pressure for each agent to follow a rule.  
In this scenario the accumulation of knowledge leads to the ability to learn about 
externalities and their causalities. If the majority realises that (1) the potential income 
from tourism increases with the biodiversity in the region and (2) that biodiversity is 
higher the more paddocks are fenced, they will signal that all paddocks should be 
fenced. It is important to mention that the GR’s aim for more wildlife because of their 
green attitude and the MO’s because of the potential increase of their profit.  
Figure 6 (b) shows that the biodiversity index increases constantly (changed scale of 
secondary y-axis to figure 3 & 4) under identical stochastic influences like previous 
scenarios. This leads to more tourism activities and profits of all ranchers increase in 
comparison to scenario 2. As the profits of the CR’s increase the most they have also 
the highest change in their knowledge because they learn from their changed 
behaviour although they were first unwilling to fence. It becomes obvious that this 
evolutionary process increases the fitness function of the rule for fencing riparian 
zone.  
In the third scenario we implemented the possibility of an evolving rule. The agents 
changed an existing (informal) rule about fencing and institutionalise that riparian 
zones have to be fenced. In technical terms it means that the ‘what kind of rule’ and 
the ‘when to activate the rule’ is modelled endogenously as a bottom-up approach. In 
many real-world cases we have to consider also the ‘intensity of a rule’. By how much 
is a person forced to pay or by how much is the consumption of a person constrained.   24
The implementation of this dimension in an agent-based model is crucial for its 
application in real-world scenarios.  
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Figure 7: Results for scenario 4,   (a) Indices for riparian zones (RZ) and rainfall 
 (b)  riparian  zones  (RZ), biodiversity (BD) and tourism activity (TA) 
  (c) rainfall and effect on profit for ranchers 
   25
Therefore, we implement in the fourth scenario the possibility of agents deciding 
about the intensity of control variables. We assume that the others cannot convince 
the CR’s, and the social pressure, which occurs by the flagging majority, leads to a 
negotiation instead of a direct change in the strategy choice. The CR’s realise that 
tourism (and biodiversity) is a common-pool resource but their expectations don’t see 
an increasing pay-off (as they are very risk avers). This means that they are willing to 
fence but just under compensation. To be able to model gradual changes in evolving 
rules we assume no direct compensation. Instead we assume the case that CR’s and 
MO’s were often talking about hiring a consultancy. In the moment when the majority 
flags their unhappiness with the unfenced property of CR’s and the CR’s offer 
negotiations, MO’s convince the GR’s to share the costs for the consultancy. This 
means that CR’s pays less for the consultancy but fence instead their riparian zones 
(indirect compensation). The consultancy delivers each period following these 
negotiations, the optimal amount of cattle per paddock under consideration of tourism 
and rainfall. Instead of last years rainfall the consultants apply a linear regression over 
all periods since t=1.  
 
In period 53, knowledge has accumulated in such a way that the majority is unhappy 
that not all paddocks along the river are fenced. As described above, this scenario 
does not assume an easily installed rule for fencing. Instead the consultancy is paid as 
a compensation for CR’s fencing effort. Comparing this with scenario 2, the result is 
an additional cost of $7,500 for GR’s and MO’s. The consultancy defines per period 
the number of cattle (optimising biodiversity induced income from tourism and direct 
income from cattle). All six ranchers follow this advice (as an informal rule). Figure 7 
(c) shows the effect on cost but at the same time there is a much higher increase of 
profit for all three rancher types (mind different scale of primary y-axis to figures 3-
5).  
9.  Summary 
This paper targeted the implementation of multiple-use issues in the context of 
common-pool resources and analysed the capability of agent-based approaches to 
model such scenarios. Therefore, this paper developed on the base of institutional 
economics and game theory a concept to model the evolution of institutions 
endogenously in an agent-based model.  
Firstly, multiple-use issues are modelled on the background of common-pool 
resources and it is shown that multiple-use can help protect common-pool resources, 
given institutions are able to adapt. Secondly, the model simulates how more elements 
of institutional change become implemented endogenously, the introduction of new 
informal rules, the consideration of new agents and the variation of the level of 
benchmarks in rules. 
The model developed in this paper shows that different aspects of evolving 
institutions modelled in an agent-based approach. The agents decide endogenously 
when to (de)activate which rule and on the upper limit of resource use. Additionally, 
the model shows the endogenous (de)activation of new agents. Those three aspects 
define important aspects of the evolution of institutional arrangements: (1) which rule, 
(2) intensity of rule and (3) which actors. 
The scenarios developed in this paper emphasise the importance of learning processes 
and of commitment of agents: Biodiversity as a common-pool resource is just 
protected by tourism as the multiple-use option if tourism operators make a   26
commitment to generate future income for ranchers. As costs for fencing riparian 
zones occur far before income from tourism occurs most ranchers avoid this 
investment. The reason is that tourism depends in this context on biodiversity which 
itself needs time to build up. This investment decision can be observed in reality and 
most institutional arrangements in communities for fencing fail because there is no 
long-term commitment of the tourist industry. 
The case studies are developed out of real-world problems linked to the research 
project  Opportunities for the Australia Outback – Researching institutional 
arrangements in the North (Greiner 2003 and Smajgl, Vella and Greiner 2003).  
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